Book Review: Warren Treadgold - A History of the Byzantine State and Society

Surely the best single-volume history of the late Roman and Byzantine Empire I've read, and perhaps the best one out there, despite being published in 1988. Copiously researched and well-organized, Treadgold balances alternating military/political chapters with economic/social chapters, so there is extensive coverage of not only the expected battles and dynastic cycles, but also the more humanistic aspects, with plentiful maps and tables of statistics on everything from military strength to budgetary woes to population distribution to help the reader keep track of how the Byzantines continuously tinkered with their society for over a thousand years in the face of continuous waves of plagues, invasions, and civil wars. 

While the Roman Empire will forever be more highly esteemed by laymen for how they steadily assembled their pan-Mediterranean state (everyone loves watching winners conquer one enemy after another), over the course of the book I developed a grudging and then unabashed respect for how the Byzantines did their best to adapt that rigid, ethnocentric, coup-prone Roman governance model to maintain a surprising amount of coherent identity in a multi-ethnic, multi-faith, multifariously-threatening world. They may have failed eventually, but you try creating an empire that lasts for over a millennium!

One of my main thoughts when reading was that I'd been previously been underrating the Great Man theory of history, or at least the ability of powerful individuals to redirect nations on different courses. Treadgold is scrupulously polite towards even plainly inept rulers - he will refrain from more than a few mildly critical adjectives of inarguably terrible emperors, and well-meaning emperors who had events beyond their control wreck their reigns get "he did as best as could be expected given the circumstances" - but it's striking how even the vast machinery of an ancient empire could be utterly upended by the whims of its leader. Peter Turchin's Seshat project, as well as his structural demographic theories of imperiogenesis and imperiopathosis in books like War and Peace and War, remain invaluable for understanding broad historical trajectories and "inevitabilities", but as I read the various expansions under successful emperors like Justinian I, Constantine VII, and Basil II, and the following contractions under unsuccessful emperors like Valens, Phocas, Romanos IV, and many others who ruled for about 10 minutes, I started trying to construct a mental model of the empire's varying health, with the ruler at the top of the pyramid:

• "hard" quantitative factors like GDP, population, territory
• "soft" qualitative factors like religious concord, social unity, "asabiya"
• random accidents and enigmas of chance
• personal qualities of rulers

Obviously no ruler, no matter how personally gifted, could completely prevent a plague, a revolt, or an invasion of Persians, (or Bulgarians, or Serbs, or Arabs, or Turks, or Crusaders, or...), and plenty of perfectly capable individuals suffered grievous misfortunes, yet it was striking how frequently, given the nearly unlimited authority vested in the emperor, their mistakes had vast consequences that took decades or even centuries to correct, if at all. In this the Byzantines were hardly unique, of course, but their exceptionally long existence gives you many more opportunities to watch one emperor carefully save money, reconquer land, and heal religious divisions, only for his idiot son to ruin everything and waste golden opportunities to defend against their enemies. This fundamental instability was exacerbated by their tendency towards conspiracy, famously memorialized today in the adjective "byzantine". Here was one of my favorite incidents of conspiracy, from the year 780 AD, in the midst of the Iconoclasm debate:

Irene, an orphan in her mid-twenties from the shrunken provincial town of Athens, had keen political instincts, a strong will, and some devoted allies in the bureaucracy. The precariousness of her position seems to have given her a sense of urgency. A month and a half after her husband's death, she foiled a plot, led by the postal logothete and the domestic of the Excubitors, to put Constantine V's second son Nicephorus on the throne.

There's no exact contemporary parallel, but imagine how we'd react if, in the middle of a near-civil war over whether to make flag-burning unconstitutional, Donald Trump suddenly died, leaving Melania as regent for Barron (ignore Ivanka and Tiffany for a moment), and she thwarted a scheme by the head of the Secret Service and the Postmaster General to put Don Jr in the White House by having them all declared felons and exiled to Guam. 

Now imagine that tended to happen every few decades! Every other major power struggled with the same issues of succession and legitimacy to some degree, but despite their impressive longevity the flaws of the Roman governance model were clearly key to Byzantine difficulties. They may not have ever been able to reconstitute the Roman Empire of old (and in fact they wisely stopped trying to reconquer obviously unattainable lands after a while), but while experiments like the senior/junior emperor system, the creation of the Themes, and professionalization of the bureaucracy gradually made the empire more resilient, up until the very last minute they perpetually had multiple claimants for the throne inviting foreign powers to aid them by promising vast rewards, and these allies would of course then immediately turn on the empire for protection money or simple plunder. It's no way to run a country.

The Byzantine religious controversies, which have earned the rightful scorn of scholars going back to Gibbon, are another great example of unnecessary conflict, given the sheer amount of time wasted and blood spilled over them. Diarmaid McCullough's Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years has a lot of great details on how the idea of a single "Christianity" has always been a fiction, as the Biblical material has been layered on top of an enormous variety of existing Mediterranean religious traditions (for a modern analogy, see the way that indigenous Mexican religious elements like the Virgin of Guadalupe, Santa Muerte, or Maximón have been smoothly and syncretically incorporated into a Catholicism that's not quite the same as in Europe or Africa). So to some extent you would have to expect some major disagreements as diverse traditions chafed under a single unified theology, particularly as the Patriarchs determined orthodoxy more or less independently from the geographically and culturally distant Popes in the west. 

But to a modern reader it's striking how frequently the empire was nearly brought to its knees at key moments by violent conflicts over arcane controversies that, one thinks, a calmer scholar like Thomas Aquinas would have wasted barely a few pages resolving with some choice Aristotle quotes. Here's a vastly oversimplified cheat sheet I kept for some of the major heresies, in chronological order:

• Arianism - Christ had a separate nature from God, though the two also share one nature in the Trinity, somehow differently than in "correct" Trinitarianism
• Nestorianism - Christ had two natures
• Monophysitism - Christ had one nature
• Monoenergism - Christ had one energy
• Monothelitism - Christ had one will
• Iconoclasm - Images of Christ/God/etc are blasphemous
• Paulicianism - Armenian Gnosticism, taking Christianity back to its mystical roots
• Bogomilism - Bulgarian Gnosticism, taking Christianity back to its mystical roots
• Palamasism - Performing hesychasm (meditative prayer) allows direct experience of the "uncreated" light of the Transfiguration, which is of God yet not the Trinity

Many of those theological controversies acted as synecdoches for those larger questions of cultural identity, of course (as I type this, the Russian Orthodox Church has momentously severed from the Patriarchate of Constantinople over their recognition of a separate Ukrainian Church in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is the biggest split since the Great Schism in 1054), yet I would love to be able to ask the various religious figures of the era exactly what they thought they were accomplishing by launching one acrimonious empire-wide quarrel after another over these openly meaningless nitpicks while various hostile powers slowly closed in; the phrase "quibbling while Rome burns" comes to mind. 

And that doesn't even cover the political, non-theological controversies that had consequences for religious unity, such as the alternations of strong Patriarch/weak Emperor and weak Patriarch/strong Emperor, or the Patriarch and the Pope fighting over bishop appointments and excommunicating each other out of spite. It's poignant to watch the East and West churches slowly squabble each other into the permanent Great Schism for no real theological reason, periodically attempting half-hearted reunions like a broken-up couple that can't quite bring themselves to move on, repeated Crusades and ecumenical councils achieving nothing but greater recrimination.

But again, whatever criticisms you have of the Byzantines, you have to be impressed by their surprising resilience in the face of continuous threats from all directions. While the western half of the Roman Empire collapsed and faded fewer than two centuries after the division under Diocletian, the eastern half maintained its heritage for a millennium. And what the Byzantines did was arguably harder than what the Romans did: it's very common for a single high-asabiya warlike group to expand their empire until there are no more worlds left to conquer, but it's far more difficult to then stably administer that empire, particularly if it's much more heterogeneous (as it should be, if your wars have gone well), particularly if you're not interested in further expanding your territory, and particularly in a high-risk area with multiple vulnerable frontiers. The Byzantines never really tried to conquer outside of what the Romans had built during the Augustan Age, and aside from occasional attempts like Justinian's to reclaim parts of the ancient west, for the most part they simply tried to maintain their territorial integrity against fairly staggering odds. 

In some ways the flexibility of Byzantine identity was actually a strength; most but not all Byzantines were Greek, or Orthodox, or followed Byzantine law, or were even necessarily under Byzantine rule, so the movement of the frontiers back and forth was not as immediately traumatic as it could have been. When Greece finally won its eventual independence in the 20th century, that its capital was not at Constantinople and its borders excluded the Ionian coast was due to the expulsion of the Greeks after the 1922 war with Turkey, which easily could have turned out differently, and thus had the collapse of the Ottoman Empire unfolded slightly differently, the entire Aegean might still reflect the political, cultural, and ethnic boundaries of a thousand years ago. There are also other legacies, less prominent but just as enduring, in Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Armenia, Italy, and everywhere else that was once part of the empire.

There's too much more to say about the Byzantine Empire, so I will just compliment Treadgold on his intensive research (many of the photos of Byzantine churches are credited to him and his family) and skill at presenting a coherent narrative out of nearly a millennium and a half of history, much of which was built out of inherently unreliable ancient accounts. The analyses of how art, architecture, and literature were affected by the political upheavals were great, my primary complaints being that I wanted more, even if the book would have been swollen to many times its already considerable length. 

In fact at many points I wished he had digressed a bit more, such as on how Islamic resistance to religious images affected the Christian iconoclasm debate, or the downstream effects of Byzantine missionaries inventing the Cyrillic alphabet, or political relations with the western states, etc, even if those were tangential to the main story. An updated edition would be nice after 30 years, but his history seemed fairly solid, and I'd bet that newer research would only enhance his conclusions. Treadgold is vivid enough at presenting the power struggles to the point where I frequently found myself doing that history nerd thing where you look up from the book and start making completely spurious analogies. This is as good as history gets for me.

Book Review: John Stuart Mill - Autobiography

The autobiography is such an ancient genre, St. Augustine having written his Confessions in 400 AD, that its conventions were already pretty fixed by the time that Mill finally completed his shortly before his 1873 death. His contribution to the genre is right in line with what we expect: an overview of his life, his work, his relationship (note the singular), and his likely legacy, balancing between honest modesty and fair self-regard. It's notable not just merely because of who he was - pioneering radical, influential politician, prescient philosopher, one of the most enduringly useful of the great modern thinkers - but because of how he thought, and though each chapter is written in that dense, fractally-claused 19th century style, the precision, honesty, and clarity of his sentiments comes across regardless. His descriptions of his own crisis of confidence, his admiration for his wife, and his accounts of his role in some of the most important political and philosophical debates of his time are still worth reading today, because aside from the historical recollections, he works in several other genres as well: implicit child-raising guide, a model for self-education and rational thinking, a self-help book on depression, advice on how to reform the political system from inside, and even some relationship goals. I'd previously read Nicolas Capaldi's biography of him and it's not bad, but there's nothing like going back to the source. This is definitely worth a stop after reading Utilitarianism and On Liberty.

His account of his childhood is fascinating. His father James Mill decided to raise him as a sort of knowledge-seeking missile, giving him nothing but impossibly ambitious classical homework and barely letting him interact with other children. The contrast between the dry tone of Mill's description of his father's methods and the profoundly ambivalent effects it obviously had on him is striking: Ancient Greek lessons at 3 years old, Latin at 8, rhetoric and history philosophy, all with scholastic discipline and criticism that sounds nearly as bad as the infamous British boarding school punishments of the day, because although his father never beat him, imagine having your father yelling at you because your elocution when orating a speech by Demosthenes at age 12 was not quite up to par. 

I was a fairly bookish child, so a boyhood of not having to go to school and just reading all day doesn't sound so bad, and yet I doubt that force-feeding you child literature like that is useful. A 10 year-old's interpretation of Thucydides can only ever be so good, right? This steroidal homeschooling did produce one of the most famous philosophers of all time, but it's not a surprise that although he respected and admired his father, Mill calmly states that he didn't love him. He would later endorse government-funded (though not government-run) mandatory education in On Liberty, so this reluctance to endorse his own schooling method is pretty interesting. One can only wonder if he would approve of the "guided self-direction" of the Montessori method as being a happy medium between the austere Plato's Republic-style force-feeding of his youth and the often-inflexible public school system we have today, or what he thought of Rousseau's system in Emile.

Of course, there's only so much you can learn from your father, even if your father is himself a major philosopher, so it's fortunate that James Mill knew many of the leading philosophic lights of the day. Mill spends many pages talking about how his personal relationships with David Hume, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, etc. as a child and young man influenced his later thinking. James Mill was an autodidact himself, perhaps he wanted to try to hurry up his son's enlightenment by giving him access to people who had already read all those books. In a way that's almost more interesting than his homeschooling background - if you deliberately unleashed your kid on your smartest friends and let them ask as many questions as they wanted and your friends would tolerate, how would that mentorship affect them? Bentham was the main influence, of course, but Mill came into contact with many people who already were or would later go on to be very significant (he himself would become godfather to Bertrand Russell), and Mill is very perceptive about what he took and what he rejected from his mentors. 

There's an inherent tension between trying to devise an authentic personal philosophy that's true to yourself, on one hand, and on the other to race ahead as fast as possible, to stand on the shoulders of giants by learning from other people as much and as quickly as possible. I think that's where judgment and discernment come in, because ultimately you need the ability to say no to people, to choose what's important from what you take in and discard the rest, and indeed one can take much of Mill's philosophy as instructive guidance on how to choose wisely, not just between ideas but between anything.

And yet we are not mere utilitarian calculating machines, as Mill illustrates with his account of his spiritual crisis at age 20. It's a fascinating account of how he found that he was unable to derive personal happiness purely by the maximize pleasure-minimize pain ethos that underlay his own philosophy. One day in the autumn of 1826, he wasn't feeling so great (it sounds sort of like one of those Sunday afternoons that Douglas Adams so memorably described as the long dark tea-time of the soul), and he started asking himself some tough questions:

In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself, 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!' At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for.

There are a truly remarkable number of thought-provoking questions embedded in that paragraph that he answers explicitly or implicitly in the remainder of the chapter:

• Is it actually possible to find true happiness in abstract thought, in any degree? For anyone, or just some? Even if it was possible for you, would that happiness be sufficient? How do you balance the importance of your own "life of the mind" with the rest of your life?
• How does your own personal temperament affect your philosophy? Is something like utilitarianism more or less likely to be believed by happy people? Does switching (or reaffirming) belief systems really change your happiness in the long run, like feeling more confident in a nicer outfit? Can you think yourself sad?
• How important are our own beliefs about the world to you, not just your answers to "big questions" but even minor tastes and opinions? What would it mean if something you thought you really loved turned out to be empty, or flat wrong, or even actively negative to your ego?
• If you don't find joy in something's ultimate conclusion, can there be anything positive about any aspect of it at all? Can you go through the motions of something and be happy, or do you need to excise the whole thing, root and branch, and move on? Does being unhappy that something failed mean that there's still something valuable there, or is unhappiness synonymous with exhaustion?
• As we go through life, does it matter at what age we have big mental paradigm shifts? Is it better to have a crisis of faith when young so you can "course correct" more easily, later so that you don't have to live through as much disappointment, or are quandaries time-invariant? How much depends on the quandary, and how much depends on you as a person?
• When you fall down, how do you find what will pick you up? Is it better to just distract yourself until you feel better and go back to what you were doing, or deliberately start on a different path? What role do other people play?

Mill spent some time depressed, then picked himself back up, rebuilt his entire value system from the ground up, and then went on to become one of the most important philosophers in modern history. That's how it's done, folks! His discovery that happiness is often easier to find when you don't chase it too directly is hardly original, but given that it's a much easier maxim to hear than to actually live, you can hardly hear it repeated too frequently. How many goals have we chased in the idea that when we reach them we will finally be satisfied, only to find out that we needlessly caused ourselves and others unhappiness along the way to an empty and unfulfilling end? How many are we still chasing right now?

A more uplifting human interest point in his life story is his relationship with Harriet Taylor, the woman who would later become his wife. One of the downsides of being raised as a child prodigy apart from your peers by a humorless father who cares mostly about your ability to recite ancient Greek is that it's not great for your sex life. On the flip side, when he met Harriet that repression gave him an admirable devotion to her, sustained platonically at the beginning since she was married at the time and then not-so-platonically after the husband conveniently died and they could then get hitched. It's a good reminder that there's no one right way to go through life, and even if you've got baggage, or what you're doing seems scandalous (there's no evidence that Mill was ever a homewrecker, but really really close friendships with someone else's spouse are red flags in any era), it's possible to come out the other side happy and fulfilled. 

Not that anyone would recommend his path to happiness, probably least of all Mill himself, but in spite of their irrationality and generally low odds of success, I think "love finds a way" stories will always find an audience, since very few of us ever take the straight line to happiness. I am honestly jealous of his appreciation for his wife as a person and a philosophical companion who complemented him. As he says: "What was abstract and purely scientific was generally mine; the properly human element came from her: in all that concerned the application of philosophy to the exigencies of human society and progress, I was her pupil, alike in boldness of speculation and cautiousness of practical judgment." He doesn't spend too much time outlining his grief at her death after only 7 years of marriage, but he clearly missed her very deeply, both as a companion and as a fellow philosopher.

One thing that separates Mill from the overwhelming majority of philosophers both ancient and modern is that he was actually a member of the House of Commons for a time, and not merely a writer. Like Marx said, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it!" It's all well and good to sit down at your desk and construct a paper paradise, but actually rolling up your sleeves and participating in the ugly moral compromises that politics requires is very different, particularly in that pre-Marx era when advocates of socialism were basing much of their reform proposals on models of primitive communism, which were as much of a dangerous distraction in the Industrial Revolution as they are now. 

Unsurprisingly, his main issues were all related to fairness: universal suffrage, reducing corruption, and instituting proportional representation. He was unhappy that no one liked his proposal that the more educated be given more votes than the less educated, which sounds anti-egalitarian, but compared to the contemporary explicit bias towards property-owners or the modern implicit bias towards rural voters, it sounds downright reasonable. He was critical to the development of British Liberal Party, but was himself reluctant to fully embrace party labels, preferring to be his own man, and when it came down to tough choices, as it did for him when considering Gladstone's Reform Bill, he was a stick-to-your-guns kind of guy even at the potential cost of passage:

I had always declined being a member of the [Reform] League, on the avowed ground that I did not agree in its programme of manhood suffrage and the ballot: from the ballot I dissented entirely; and I could not consent to hoist the flag of manhood suffrage, even on the assurance that the exclusion of women was not intended to be implied; since if one goes beyond what can be immediately carried and professes to take one’s stand on a principle, one should go the whole length of the principle.

For the most part his views as expressed here only reinforce my idea of Mill as a thinker tirelessly trying to find the most logical way to systematize and thus extend morality. As a member of that unhappy tribe of non-socialist liberals, without the helpful guiding light of a dogma, many of his difficulties with his fellow legislators stemmed from his insistence at trying to universalize moral concepts in a system that encouraged parochialism. For example, during the US Civil War there was a real danger that the UK would support the Confederacy instead of the Union out of crass commercial interests (Karl Marx, then covering the war as a journalist for the New York Tribune, also correctly argued against this view at length), and for many British legislators, the Civil War really did seem like those "it was about states' rights" myths you still heard about sometimes: "There were men of high principle and unquestionable liberality of opinion who thought it a dispute about tariffs, or assimilated it to the cases in which they were accustomed to sympathise, of a people struggling for independence." 

His friend David Hume infamously said of logic: "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." You can look at Mill's entire parliamentary career as a struggle to show that moral passion and the highest reasoning faculties are not in fact opposed, although judging by the fact that one of his best and most famous lines is still as relevant today as it was in 1861, his successes are tempered at best: "The Conservative party was, by the law of its constitution, necessarily the stupidest party. Now, I do not retract this assertion; but I did not mean that Conservatives are generally stupid; I meant, that stupid persons are generally Conservative."

The best Mill is his philosophical works, though his accounts of his practical experiences in his career are filled with fascinating little historical asides. For example, I never knew that Mill played such an important role in promoting acceptance of Lord Durham's recommendation for the 1840 unification of French and English Canada, which laid the foundation for modern Canada's creation in 1867 and become the template for the motherland's relationship to the other British colonies. His discussions with famous friends, his disputes with other leading lights, and his recollections of a long and productive life make certain elements of Utilitarianism and On Liberty make a lot more sense; I guess on some level our abstract mental systems of the world can never really be fully divorced from personal experience, and understanding where someone is coming from tells you a lot about where they're trying to go to. 

An autobiography might be as much mortification as inspiration, like George Orwell's line about how "A man who gives a good account of himself is probably lying, since any life when viewed from the inside is simply a series of defeats", but Mill had such an exceptionally eventful life that even with his characteristic modesty and understatement it's truly hard to see how he could have written a better or more useful book. His life was his work, and he did a ton of it.

Book Review: Annie Lowrey - Give People Money

The concept of a Universal Basic Income has been around in various forms for quite a while, but it's become more politically relevant recently for several reasons: rapid technological change combined with international supply chains, growing global wealth yet widening inequality, and the sense that not only do we now have the social structure to truly end poverty forever, but that the best tool is also the simplest. There are many examples in miniature of what a UBI could look like; Lowrey covers both historical and recent programs in places like India, Kenya, and Alaska to explore what has worked to reduce poverty, and what has not. 

For example, delivering unconditional cash grants via India's Aadhaar program (a vast biometric digital identity scheme tied to pensions, banking, census, and various welfare functions) has had many of the intended poverty reduction benefits, but at the cost of great disruption to established patterns of life; requiring that individuals receive their benefits themselves reduces fraud, but sometimes the system crashes, or someone can't send their relative to pick up the money and has to take off work, or they can't make the side deals they used to. That kind of James Scott's Seeing Like a State central control vs local knowledge stuff would be critical in any kind of implementation, both between countries (would a UBI dramatically increase illegal immigration from countries without them?) and within them (would poor people just waste a non-means tested UBI or otherwise stop entering the labor market?), so even beyond the philosophical question of "should we?", the "how exactly?" question remains.

Science fiction has dealt with these questions for a long time, so in addition to the extensive analysis of real pilot programs, Lowrey touches on what, if anything we can learn from those explorations in terms of program design. The founding text for modern sci-fi worlds of plenty is probably Keynes' famous 1930 essay "Economic Possibilities For Our Grandchildren", where he accurately predicted that by 2030 we'd be between 4 and 8 times as rich as in 1930, but inaccurately predicted that we'd all therefore choose to work much less. Star Trek is the most famous fictional example of a society that has solved the "economic problem" and allowed people to work for fun rather than out of necessity, but the questions of how one would actually acquire wine from Picard's family vineyard or gumbo from Sisko's restaurant were usually left offscreen (Manu Saadia's pleasingly nerdy Trekonomics is cited at length). 

For a different take I wish she had also discussed Neal Stephenson's The Diamond Age, in which free replicators simply increase inequality, a fantastically wealthy overclass taking full advantage of technological cornucopia while the proles squander their dole in a manner familiar to Dickens. I think the question of whether free money corrodes the work ethic is an empirical question, and as Lowrey shows, while of course some people in Alaska do spend their free money on luxuries, the idea that most or even many people would waste precious funds is more fantastical than Star Trek, where everyone is an amateur archaeologist or chef or what have you.

There are even some conservatives, like Charles Murray, who advocate a UBI as a replacement for the existing welfare state precisely because it maximizes personal choice in that way, and is not susceptible to the familiar incentive-warping problems of means-tested programs: if a program like Medcaid is only available to those with an income less than $X, the strong incentive not to make more than $X can end up entrenching poverty rather than reducing it, to say nothing of how complex overlapping benefits programs are. However, the seemingly more dystopian concept of a federal jobs guarantee seems to be competing for mindshare as the preferred solution for poverty, particularly among liberals. 

I haven't seen a jobs guarantee show up in fiction to a great degree, but as Nick Taylor's superb history American Made shows, in the real world America still depends to a surprising degree on the infrastructure built during the Great Depression by the Works Progress Administration, the first real experiment with guaranteed jobs. The two concepts need not be opposed - I don't see why people couldn't choose to supplement their UBI by also accepting a government job - but it is striking that a UBI seems much more popular among intellectuals than a jobs guarantee, given the historical record of each. Perhaps the worry is that guaranteed jobs could become mandatory jobs, combining the worst aspects of the medieval corvée with Soviet subbotniks. A UBI seems much more difficult to run poorly than a jobs guarantee, but the work requirements that conservative states are trying to inflict upon their Medicaid recipients should indicate that a government that's determined to harass its poorest or most vulnerable citizens will find a way.

Keynes was a big champion of capitalism as the best tool to raise living standards, and ultimately the idea of ending poverty is an economic question as much as a moral one. It may be that truly ending it involves a sort of struggle against diminishing returns: a typical capitalist economy working well enough for most people (80%?), with guaranteed jobs picking up the majority of the slack (15%?), and a UBI covering those few who for whatever reason can't handle employment in either the private or public sectors. The last mile of anything is always the most difficult, but since a UBI covers everyone, it's less susceptible to the "programs for poor people are poor programs" issues that that currently plague America's haphazard, rickety, and often racist welfare state. 

The single most difficult aspect of a UBI is the funding structure, and here Lowrey predictably is less able to give useful guidance, since these are bitter political and practical questions. Alaska's scheme is funded from oil, but not only is every state not Alaska, but even Alaska might find its wells running dry someday. As FDR said of his own attempt to fund a UBI for the elderly: "We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program." 

We don't have as much fiscal space as FDR did back in the welfare state's infant days, so either coming up with new taxes, such as on financial transactions or wealth, or finding acceptable ways to increase existing taxes, will prove the most challenging part of all. But, as Lowrey shows, there's no real mystery to ending poverty - just give people money.

Book Review: Zachary Mason - Void Star

Mason's previous book The Lost Books of the Odyssey was spectacular, so I'm unhappy that this sci-fi novel didn't live up to it for me, especially because as a computer scientist this should have been home turf for him. On a prose level, this is great; there are no iconic, standout lines like Neuromancer's "The sky above the port was the color of television, tuned to a dead channel", but just about every sentence is beautifully written, well-balanced and full of interesting imagery. There really isn't a wasted sentence in the whole book, so his various scenes and landscapes are always vividly rendered. However, much like in Neuromancer (and a lot of this novel is like in Neuromancer), the plot isn't very emotionally resonant, so the lucid language feels wasted. Characters act, choices are made, and things then happen, but according to a rapid, purely internal logic that doesn't give the reader much opportunity to get invested in the world, especially because the point of view shifts so rapidly and a lot of the various perils come out of nowhere. "Sit back and let the plot take you for a ride!" sounds like cheesy marketing copy on the back of an airport thriller, but it's also pretty apt here, and I didn't like feeling like such a passive reader.

The world is your standard cyberpunk quasi-dystopia that owes much to Snow Crash (itself an affectionate Neuromancer parody/homage), but without the manic humor or invention of Stephenson's work, so instead of people living in self-storage complexes guarded by armed robot dogs, people just live in grungy favelas, and instead of Sumerian technolinguistic mind-viruses, there's just really powerful Hackers-style algorithms (they literally hack the Gibson in one scene). I also found myself questioning why Mason bothered with 3 narrative lines for the main characters - ascetic street boxer Kern, dying political scion Thales, and Johnny Mnemonic-style hacker Irina - since although they do eventually intersect to fight the requisite evil rich guy and super-powerful AI, their individual quests to uh, find the secret of life/upload consciousness into the computer/become a Japanese swordmaker don't feel emotionally connected at all. Maybe the characters could have spent more time together, or there could have been fewer 2-page chapters to let the story breathe a bit; certainly many aspects of the world could have used some more exploration. I hate ragging on a work by an author I respect so much, so perhaps this will improve on a reread, but this feels like a real letdown, especially because he was able to be so creative with almost literally the most played-out material in history in his last book. I hope he takes more risks in his next book.

Book Review: Yasha Levine - Surveillance Valley

Usually the news stories fretting about how much power tech companies have over our lives that appear every day are framed as the cost of doing business: for example, the reason why Google makes it so hard to turn off location tracking is that they just really want to serve you targeted ads. But while those privacy concerns can and often do boil down to simple greed, one reason why problems of tracking and control are so endemic is that Silicon Valley is intimately connected to the national security state/military-industrial complex, and though most popular histories of computers and the internet emphasize the free-spirited glamour of the hacker culture, one might as well think of the suite of apps on a typical phone as a voluntary counter-insurgency program that we carry out on ourselves. As Levine chronicles, much is made of the power of technology to aid people's fight for freedom, as in coverage of how the organizers of the Arab Spring revolutions used Twitter and Facebook, but less attention is paid to how governments use that same technology to monitor dissidents, control demonstrations, and prevent unrest before it ever occurs.

The connections between tech companies and law enforcement go much deeper than that police departments sometimes also use Gmail. Levine relates many seminal historical events like IBM's collaboration with Nazi Germany, the internet's origins in ARPA, the funding of many supposedly liberatory technologies like Tor by the government, the activities of figures like Peter Thiel who bridge PayPal and Palantir, and the CALEA mandate for telecom companies, showing that for every starry-eyed visionary who saw computers as "bicycles for the mind", in Steve Jobs' phrase, there was another steely-eyed capitalist with no qualms about furnishing governments with whatever they needed to keep tabs on restive populations. It's not that people don't care about privacy, as periodically NSA programs like PRISM become big news for a while, but anyone truly interested in issues like internet freedom has to pay attention to Silicon Valley as well as Washington. It may be that the idea that anyone could use the internet without being watched was always a fantasy, but while Levine doesn't present quite as bleak of a world as, say, Adam Curtis, who he cites a few times, anyone who's seen a few of Curtis' documentaries ("They had a vision of a new world, free from politics... but then something strange happened") will find much that's unhappily familiar here.

Book Review: Viktor Frankl - Man's Search for Meaning

This is one of those "everyone has read this" classics that contains a lot of hard-won wisdom, and whose insights are worth reiterating even if you've read similar books about therapy or happiness. It's two books in one, and the relationship between the two is interesting even above and beyond their contents. The first half is an extremely moving portrait of the horrors of his time in several WW2 concentration camps, and like a non-fiction equivalent to Varlam Shalamov's fictional Kolyma Tales, Frankl's near-death experiences are made even more powerful by his calm, detached narration. His dry descriptions of the camp, the guards, and the lives of the prisoners are set against the grim absurdities of his near-helplessness at the chance events which determined whether someone lived or died, and those physical struggles are contrasted with his emotional striving to find something to live for, the spiritual sustenance that is almost more important than physical sustenance for a human being to survive the worst that his fellow humans can subject him to. The second half is a brief description of Frankl's chosen psychological discipline of logotherapy, a type of therapy which seems to descend from Stoicism and have left a legacy in modern cognitive-behavioral therapy. It was not nearly as affecting as the first half, but as Frankl himself considers it the more important part, the two haves together are more valuable than either alone.

Outside of questionably authentic thriller novels like Papillon, prison literature tends to be on the grim side. It's just really hard to avoid emphasizing how brutal prison is, and that goes more so for anything about gulags or concentration camps, where death is typically the only way out. The short fiction of the Kolyma Tales remains my gold standard for depictions of bureaucratized horror, but the added realism of Frankl's experiences is not any less harrowing. This section is full of ethical dilemmas, inhuman atrocities, nightmarish gambles (should you volunteer for an extra shift of duty, which could bring you some extra favor but also carries the risk of a quick death?), and cruelty that is not any less cruel for being done out of impersonal duty rather than personalized malice. The only way to remain sane is to concentrate on the good, to find something to live for beyond yourself, yet with the knowledge that fate has its own ideas (Frankl mentions the fable "Death in Tehran", which I'd previously read as "Appointment in Samarra", wherein a man's efforts to avoid his scheduled death only hasten it). The peculiar mixture of constant background risk of death and unbearable tedium reminds him of a Bismarck quote: "Life is like being at the dentist. You always think that the worst is still to come, and yet it is over already." To find your purpose won't save you from death, but without something to live for you're dead even before your body grows cold.

Though it's those narrative parts that will be most likely to stick with readers, in the Preface to my 1992 edition Frankl mentions that the first half of the book is really just an explication of the second half about logotherapy, which is very important to him: his precious manuscript which he lost on his first day in camp was about logotherapy, so it's interesting to see how his drive to see it through to publication helped him survive four different concentration camps before he even published it. I won't pretend to fully understand it - there are too many terms like "noögenic neuroses" and "the existential vacuum" for me to be really comfortable - but it's striking how the purpose of publishing the manuscript helped Frankl popularize a discipline that's intended to help people find purpose. There is much of his real life experience in that quotation from Nietzsche: "He who has a WHY to live for can bear almost any HOW." As he says:

Logotherapy, keeping in mind the essential transitoriness of human existence, is not pessimistic but rather activistic. To express this point figuratively we might say: The pessimist resembles a man who observes with fear and sadness that his wall calendar, from which he daily tears a sheet, grows thinner with each passing day. On the other hand, the person who attacks the problems of life actively is like a man who removes each successive leaf from his calendar and files it neatly and carefully away with its predecessors, after first having jotted down a few diary notes on the back. He can reflect with pride and joy on all the richness set down in these notes, on all the life he has already lived to the fullest.

There's a great Kafka aphorism that I wish Frankl had referenced, because it bears directly on that insistence that logotherapy be attuned to action:

You can hold back from the suffering of the world, you have free permission to do so, and it is in accordance with your nature. But perhaps the holding back is the one suffering you could have avoided.

We know that not nearly all psychological issues can be solved by calm discussion with a therapist, no matter how well trained, and that sometimes suffering isn't ennobling but merely enervating. Frankl is a powerful example of someone who used his suffering to find meaning and achieve good things in the world, and he acknowledges that there were many others who tried no less hard who never made it out of Auschwitz. But while suffering is not a necessary or sufficient condition for finding a purpose, Frankl is absolutely correct in asserting that finding meaning is possible even in the face of seemingly unendurable suffering, which should cheer up people who are in circumstances less dire than Auschwitz (i.e. just about all of us). Perhaps meaning is where you find it, and the clear corollary - that almost any road could lead there - means that logotherapy is no shortcut to psychic satisfaction, but if "the journey can be the destination", and "the real meaning is the friends we made along the way", and so forth through those clichés, then merely by encouraging people to actively find meaning in their lives Frankl has done the world a valuable service, and proved his own point in the process. Not bad!

Book Review: Limor Shifman - Memes in Digital Culture

The MIT Essential Knowledge Series is the perfect venue for a book on something like this, and in keeping with its subject there's a lot packed into a small space. Memes and viral content are ubiquitous, and even if individually each shared image is trivial, in the aggregate they present a fascinating window into a fundamental aspect of human communication that the internet has vastly amplified. Richard Dawkins was the first person to fix the idea of the meme in the public consciousness, proving his own point by giving the amorphous concept of an informational analogue to the gene a compact, shareable name and definition. However, Shifman mentions two main conceptual difficulties with a neat meme-gene analogy: firstly that people commonly refer to a "meme" as both an individual unit of selection (a gene) and as a unit of transmission (a virus), which are different things; and secondly that people are not helpless vectors for meme reproduction but are actors and meme creators themselves. This is not simple nitpicking, since borrowing terminology from evolutionary biology and epidemiology without care can only lead to confusion and obscure actual insights, and though the book's 2014 vintage makes it practically antediluvian in its examples, its careful analysis of both human and memetic behavior is perfectly undiminished by time.

In one sense, the internet is merely the latest transmission vector for memes, not truly a qualitatively different medium from the books, TV, audio recordings, etc that people used to use to share ideas in the before-time. But even in addition to offering, for the very first time ever, the tantalizing prospect of quantified empirical data on idea transmission, the internet has vastly transformed three key aspects of memes: longevity, fecundity, and copy fidelity. Pity our ancestors: one imagines a poor farming family in the depths of Nebraska in the 1800s, waiting anxiously on the porch of their sod-roofed homestead for a quarterly meme update from the big cities back East tucked neatly next to the Sears Roebuck catalog... no longer! Thanks to what Shifman terms the "hypermimetic logic" of the internet, in practical terms there are more memes than it is possible to humanly experience, with memes mutating and spawning new clades and taxa so rapidly that much of the attention-based economy of the modern internet is based on either exploiting something that's already viral or trying to manufacture something viral out of nothing.

But again, a meme is not a piece of viral content, although the two are often used synonymously (side note: "piece of viral content" is a clunky phrase and "virus" sounds bad; would something like "vireme" work better?). Exact definitions are tricky to make, and nearly impossible to sustain, but the basic idea is that a piece of viral content is a single thing that spreads to many people, while a meme is a "group of content units", each of which could be modified while the whole thing is recognizably descended from a single image, which could then also spread virally. Thus, to use one of her examples, the infamous "Leave Britney alone!" video is a piece of viral content, which then became a meme once people latched onto various aspects (the hair, the eyeliner, the bedsheet, the "Leave X aloooone!" plaint) to make their own parodies/imitations/tributes. Some viral items are rich enough in imagery and hooks to inspire vast families of memetic descendants, "Gangnam Style" being the current best example, but even relatively absurd and meaningless viral content like planking or "Kilroy was here" can be memeified, as the latter was referenced with hilariously nerdy panache as a Kilroy-shaped band-pass filter by Thomas Pynchon in his novel V. It's very rare for something to go viral without also getting memed, but there's still a useful distinction between a dendritic "founder-based meme" such as "Leave Britney alone!" that has a clear original viral basis, and a rhizomatic "egalitarian meme" like LOLcats, where theoretically there must have been a single original Ur-funny cat image but currently consists of an endless sea of comedically equal variations.

Of course, truly proving why one thing goes viral and spawns a million memes while something seemingly identical doesn't is a vast and almost certainly impossible goal. Christian Bauckhage had a 2011 paper titled "Insight Into Internet Memes", lamentably uncited here, which fit the popularity (using Google search results) of various memes into a few distributions, but refrained from entering the "why" debate, as it seems beyond the power of data science alone to explain "why" one meme's popularity fits a log-normal distribution and another's doesn't. Surely it must be some mix of inherent latent virality and the random luck of being in the right place at the right time shared by the right people, if we could ever break down the exact factors. Duncan Watts' superb book Everything Is Obvious (Once You Know the Answer) raised many of these same questions in the context of influence in social networks and how some people get to be so influential while most of the rest of us won't ever be, or how some songs become popular while others don't.

Shifman has a more sociological theory of virality, however, and as she says, successful viral content checks off as many of the 6 Ps as possible: 

• positivity
• provocation of high-intensity emotions
• packaging
• prestige
• positioning in social context
• participation, maybe the most important factor. 

This makes intuitive sense - boring irrelevant crap made by nobodies that no one ever sees is unlikely to go viral almost by definition - yet for all the countless YouTube videos out there that master some combination of relatable protagonists, flawed masculinity, humor, simplicity, repetitiveness, and whimsical content that Shifman identifies as crucial to viral success (see Mark O'Connell's excellent short book Epic Fail for a more poignant meditation on the appeal of watching people fail at something), there are even countless more videos out there that no one besides their creators will ever see. The numberless descendants of "Gangnam Style" might make it the Genghis Khan of memes, yet it too exists in a meme ecosystem where the overwhelming majority of similar K-pop music videos make barely a ripple on the international stage.

And it is on that international stage where the potential existence of a formula for virality and memetic success can be most clearly investigated. The somewhat ugly term "glocalization" refers to the ability of viral content to originate in one culture or context, spread to another, and then acquire memetic aspects specific to its new home. Shifman uses the example of "I upgraded Girlfriend 7.0 to Wife 1.0!" and its gender-reversed counterpart as examples of an incredibly hackneyed joke that is nevertheless extremely popular worldwide because it plays on such familiar stereotypes (although with some significant modifications for some cultures, such as Arabic or Japanese, which don't always have exactly the same cultural signifiers). Same with the American meme Successful Black Man becoming Humanist Ultra Orthodox Man in Israel. Political memes often resist translation, since although some complaints with government are universal, others - the Pepper-Spraying Cop at UC Davis, the "grass mud horse" of Chinese battles against government censors, satires of Benjamin Netanyahu or Nicolas Sarkozy's attempts to take credit or be present for everything - require just a bit too much cultural specificity to go global. Political meme urges are universal, but as Tip O'Neill might have said, all political memes are local.

The final chapter is an admirably humble call for further research on a number of memetic avenues, all of which I second:

• The politics of meme participation. With rare exceptions, the demographics of successful meme creators, influencers, and users looks remarkably similar to the demographics of just about every successful anything: young, well-off, straight white males front and center. If the internet theoretically gives everyone an equal voice, what gives?
• Memes as a language. People use memes to pithily communicate an incredibly broad variety of mental and emotional states to others, yet not all of them translate well. What's the general distribution of memetic communication on the "universal" to "extremely niche micro-sub-culture" spectrum, and why do particular memes fall where they do?
• Memes and political change. Some political memes become popular, and some are then successful, but these paths are neither universal nor uniformly paced - how should we interpret the varying success of memes like "I am the 99%" vs "repeal the death tax"? What about "Carthago delenda est" vs "54-40 or fight"?
• Viral and memetic success. Here's where research like Duncan Watts' or Christian Bauckhage's is important: a better typology of memes can help with the etiology. Once we know the "what"s, then the "how"s and "why"s of memes become much easier to study.

And yes, the book does end with a meme.

Book Review: Min Jin Lee - Pachinko

"History has failed us, but no matter" belongs up there in the pantheon of opening lines, and it's especially apt, given that this is not quite a "historical novel", but a novel which uses the vicissitudes of real history - the Japanese occupation and annexation of Korea, the migration of Koreans to Japan for work, the devastation of WW2, the partition of Korea - to follow an ordinary Korean peasant family from the very early part of the 20th century near to its end as successive generations experience poverty, fall in love, settle in Japan, try to make money, survive wars, encounter racism, and, most of all, try to turn their sorrows into fulfilling lives. Korean history is something I have large gaps of understanding in relative to Japanese and Chinese history, particularly prior to WW2, so I would have appreciated this novel even if it hadn't been so affecting. Many questions of Korean identity are raised repeatedly by Koreans, South Koreans, North Koreans, and Korean-Japanese; I don't have any special take on that, but for me the pleasure of the novel lies in how these lovingly rendered characters make their choices, and how those choices define their lives but also present new opportunities even when they're really painful. Pachinko is, of course, a popular game for gamblers, and the central idea that fate and freedom are present in every moment is very movingly presented here.

Book Review: Hans Rosling - Factfulness

When Bill Gates read this book, he liked it so much that he not only gushed copiously about it on his blog, he also offered to cover the cost of the ebook for every college graduate in the United States. Dang! In fairness to him, Factfulness is basically a Gates-seeking missile - it's a slim, efficient volume focused on exactly the issues of global poverty and economic development that he's spent the last few decades thinking about, and it's not only packed with interesting data but also accompanied with a neatly itemized mental checklist for identifying and countering some major cognitive biases that affect the interpretation of that data. Its author, who created the excellent data visualization site Gapminder, sadly passed away before the book's release, but his children/cofounders cleaned up his manuscript and published it in the belief that its framework was too important to abandon. I agree - while individually each of these cognitive biases are familiar, rarely do you see them so neatly categorized, or so clearly applied to such important issues. Best of all, its positive conclusions are hopeful without being too airy, and its message of data-supported optimism is needed immensely in a world that seems tailor-made to dishearten us.

Even people who "don't pay attention to the news" pay attention to the news, they just tend do it badly, and they are not alone: all of us have an incomplete view of the world, almost by definition. It's true enough that there's enough news about war, poverty, deprivation, disease, and unhappiness in the world to depress just about anyone, yet being depressed about the world is exactly what this book is warning against. All of us have cognitive biases that affect how we process information, particularly about faraway strangers living lives that don't have much to do with us directly, and that's not helped by the media's well-known "if it bleeds, it leads" tendency, which we unfortunately encourage. Life truly is not as bad around the world as it seems, but in order to appreciate the dramatic progress the world has made in recent years, you not only have to filter out a big percentage of the shouting, you also have to unlearn some cognitive biases. Context is key, but that's exactly what we don't often get from the news, and so we have to supply it on our own.

Rosling uses many examples from his home country of Sweden to that effect, showing that many of our beliefs about foreign countries should look different with a bit of context. For example, no one should feel good when reading about a high rate of child mortality in developing nations, but learning that that statistic is actually lower than the equivalent number for most Western nations in the early part of the 20th century not only lowers your blood pressure, it makes you appreciate the tremendous work of governments, companies, NGOs, and the people themselves. It also helps you think more clearly about what's still to be done, since without context, foreign problems can seem utterly intractable. We often forget that while civilization doesn't always progress evenly in each part of the world, it usually does progress, and though it's very easy to simply toss news items into the Good or Bad bucket, especially in a rich Western country consumed with its own issues, life is getting better for more people at a faster rate than at any point in human history.

If you're like me, whenever you read a statement like "life is getting better!" you almost automatically leap to provide counterexamples of world tragedies, but, cleverly, this book provides its own tools to prove its thesis! Normally books that try to prove themselves are to be taken extremely skeptically ("of course the Bible/Koran/Torah is true, it says so itself!"), but I really don't think it's possible to argue against any of its 10 Rules of Thumb, especially when applied to the data herein, because even if you might decide that one or another of them isn't applicable, they are inarguably useful. Rosling presents a list of 10 instincts that we all have, and recommends some strategies for whenever we notice them in ourselves reacting to the daily parade of horribles:

1. The gap instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when a story talks about a gap, and remembering that this paints a picture of two separate groups, with a gap in between. The reality is often not polarized at all. Usually the majority is right there in the middle, where the gap is supposed to be.
2. The negativity instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when we get negative news, and remembering that information about bad events is much more likely to reach us. When things are getting better we often don't hear about them. This gives us a systematically too-negative impression of the world around us, which is very stressful.
3. The straight line instinct - Factfulness is recognizing the assumption that a line will just continue straight, and remembering that such lines are rare in reality.
4. The fear instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when frightening things get our attention, and remembering that these are not necessarily the most risky. Our natural fears of violence, captivity, and contamination make us systematically overestimate these risks.
5. The size instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when a lonely number seems impressive (small or large), and remembering that you could get the opposite impression if it were compared with or divided by some other relevant number.
6. The generalization instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when a category is being used in an explanation, and remembering that categories can be misleading. We can't stop generalization and we shouldn't even try. What we should try to do is to avoid generalizing incorrectly.
7. The destiny instinct - Factfulness is recognizing that many things (including people, countries, religions, and cultures) appear to be constant just because the change is happening slowly, and remembering that even small, slow changes gradually add up to big changes.
8. The single perspective instinct - Factfulness is recognizing that a single perspective can limit your imagination, and remembering that it is better to look at problems from many angles to get a more accurate understanding and find practical solutions.
9. The blame instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when a scapegoat is being used and remembering that blaming an individual often steals the focus from other possible explanations and blocks our ability to prevent similar problems in the future.
10. The urgency instinct - Factfulness is recognizing when a decision feels urgent and remembering that it rarely is.

Note that unlike many "Rules for X" lists out there, these are not ideological prescriptions masquerading as objectivity. It seems like it's usually conservatives urging delay or inaction on any given issue (which in fact is one of the primary definitions of "conservative"), but none of these heuristics support, for example, reducing or ceasing efforts to lower child mortality; in fact all of these strategies could just as well be used on the claim that child mortality is nothing to worry about. This means that it's also totally fair to use these tools to argue we should be more concerned about something than we already are. So yes: any tools that help us reckon the magnitude of our problems, fairly weigh evidence, and accurately determine solutions are welcome in our struggles with wars, diseases, famines, poverty, and climate change. This book did not invent any of its strategies, but I have never personally seen them gathered together in once place like this, so in spite of its slim size it makes an extremely convenient handbook. Perhaps Gates was not wrong to consider it as necessary for college students as any official textbook.

Book Review: Lisa Halliday - Asymmetry

I wonder if some assistant editor greenlit the novel's title as a sarcastic commentary on its uneven quality; theoretically it alludes to some discussions of "imbalances of power/understanding" that the main characters have, or something like that, but I prefer my interpretation because I found the first and longest section to be formally well-written but almost completely unengaging emotionally. It's about Alice, a mid-twenties book editor who enters into a relationship with Ezra, a much older Famous Author who bears a striking resemblance to Philip Roth. In real life, author Lisa Halliday was romantically involved with the real Philip Roth, who in an unhappy coincidence died right around when Asymmetry was published. There's absolutely nothing inherently wrong with a roman à clef, but this section is as undramatic as it is long. Halliday is a zippy writer, so any individual sentence is well-crafted, but in plot terms there's not much interesting going on at any point, and since only the passage of time connects the scenes together it feels like a collection of rejected short stories that happen to feature the same characters: various geriatric medical issues, lots of baseball chat, Ezra keeps failing to win the Nobel Prize, they go on vacation together, Alice worries about her own creativity - who cares? There's not even any good sex scenes, as one would hope for from a story leveraging that link to fame, although Halliday does gift the world with the memorable simile "He came like a weak water bubbler."

My feelings changed dramatically in the (seemingly) completely unrelated second section, where Amar, an Iraqi-American economist, is detained at Heathrow while traveling back to Iraq because his brother has been kidnapped. This narrative takes place mainly while its protagonist is stuck in the maddening, pointless, absurd bureaucratic hell of airport security, so it's much more emotionally vivid and relatable if you've done any recent air travel, and even if you haven't, the asides where he explores his memories of his family and his now-distant relationship to his brother in the grim, sad, lethal landscape of post-Surge Iraq are quite moving. You really feel for Amar during every minute of his helpless agony as his life is put on hold by greater powers though individually each functionary is perfectly pleasant and helpful, and each recollection of his relationship with his disparate family members is full of personality. This section is well-paced and full of stakes and emotion, and perhaps it should have been the whole book, but just when you're in a rhythm and turning the pages, it flatly ends with another tragedy and a graceless jump-cut to the coda, a fictional Desert Island Discs episode with Ezra where he's since broken up with Alice but finally bagged that Nobel, unlike the real-life Roth. Neat, I guess. Kudos to Halliday for giving him good musical taste at least, and the way that Ezra puts the moves on the interviewer at the very end is pretty funny.

What to make of this? Amar's section doesn't appear to have anything to do with Alice's story, but if you pay really close attention there are some little hints that his story was actually Alice's creation, the work of her own that she had been vaguely worrying about to Ezra in the first section. So there is a very faint glimmer of Pale Fire-type conceptual playfulness between the narratives, but that actually almost made it worse for me: the whole point of Alice's story was to set up Amar's parade of tragedy, which just ends unsatisfyingly, and wasn't even "real" to begin with? I think the Amar section might have worked better as an Ezra product, since we got told a bunch how brilliant he was but never saw any of his theoretically Nobel-caliber writing, and as an Alice product it just gave me unpleasant thoughts about its likely genesis: what if Asymmetry is to the Lisa Halliday/Philip Roth relationship as Amar's story is to Alice/Ezra's - an attempt to prove creative independence to a more famous fling, and the reason the Alice/Ezra section is so boring is because it's basically a diary with the names changed? Alice and Ezra discuss the challenges of truly empathizing with someone; perhaps that's actually Halliday's issue, and the dull parts of this novel are like the infamous writer's block-induced "play about a struggling playwright"? In any case, hopefully readers with stronger connections to the New York literary scene fishbowl than I have will get more out of this novel.